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“You are undone if you once forget that  
the fruits of the earth belong to us all, 
and the earth itself to nobody." 
 
-Jean Jacques Rousseau’s Defender of Anarchy 
 A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 
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Abstract 
 
 The South Asian world is dominated by India and China, their combined 
populations equaling almost a full half of humankind. In 1962, the two countries 
clashed over their border. The main reason for the war was the contest over large 
areas of territory claimed by both countries. The border still has not been adequately 
defined. This essay examines the border dispute from its roots in history, through the 
20th century and into the present. It was the goal of this work to give an unbiased 
account of the dispute, though the weight of evidence in favor of the Indian claim has 
influenced my conclusions. This topic is one of the most relevant issues in modern 
Asia, though the absence of any recent armed conflict over the areas have caused 
public interest in it to wane. Central to the dispute is the issue of Tibet and Chinese 
occupation therein. The history and circumstances surrounding the border are 
instrumental in settling the dispute and keeping peace in Asia. 
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Introduction 
China and India have become two of the world’s largest economic powers. 
Their combined population is almost half of the world’s entire population. The two 
giants share a land border that spans over 2,000 miles.1 Much of this border remains 
undefined, and the delineation between China and India is not an actual boundary in 
many places, but a line of control. 
The border between India and China lies in the western region of China, 
dividing India and the Tibet region. This was once internationally considered a border 
between Tibet and India. Of course, when China began to exercise authority in Tibet 
in the 1950s, this was no longer the case. With the change in de facto sovereignty in 
Tibet, the relationship between China and India changed greatly. Alongside this, Mao 
Zedong called the accepted border between what was once Tibet and India into 
question. 
The entire dispute, in fact, hinges around Tibet, the government of Lhasa, and 
the Chinese occupation of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Before China’s military 
took over Tibet, there was almost no question of the lines that divided Tibet and 
India. They were clearly marked in treaties made by the British with the government 
in Lhasa. The question of Tibet’s independence is synonymous with the question of 
where the boundary lies between China and India. If, in fact, Lhasa’s sovereignty 
over Tibet can be verified as historically valid pre-1950, then Lhasa’s treaties with the 
British are legal and definitive of the boundary. Yet, because Bejing claims that even 
at that time Tibet was a Chinese territory, and that the Tibetan government had no 
legal right to make treaties with foreign governments or to cede territory, they reserve                                                         
1 The Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force Website. 
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the right to call these treaties into question. The question of Tibet’s independence is 
not only the key question that began the debate over the boundary, it is also of 
paramount importance to keeping peace in Asia.  
 
History, Pre-Simla Convention 
The origins of the border dispute date back to British colonial rule in India. 
Before this time, the border was considered a “traditional” border, in which there was 
a place that was clearly under Indian rule and a place where that rule was no longer 
effective, but it was unclear where exactly India began and ended. Historically, China 
had little interest in defining its border, because the weak states surrounding China 
were not subordinate to the Emperor, but they posed no threat to the superiority of 
Chinese rule. Often times the surrounding kingdoms would pay an annual tribute to 
the Emperor, allowing him to benefit from their relationship without stretching and 
overtaxing his rule. According to Robinson and Shambaugh in their book Chinese 
Foreign Policy, the tributary system caused China to believe that boundaries had little 
significance, until colonialists took over the bordering states.2 It was then that the 
British practically dragged Chinese officials to the discussion of the border. 
Originally, as the British tried to ensure unwavering control of their territory 
in India, they employed a policy of using “buffer states” under the control of another, 
weak government, to insulate India from aggression. Tibet itself was one of these 
buffer states. And, oddly enough, Britain did not consider it a buffer against China. At 
the time the weakened Manchu Empire, known as the Qing Dynasty of China, was                                                         
2 Robinson, Thomas and Shambaugh, David, Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 352-3. 
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merely placated with respectful tones in British correspondence, but was by all means 
disregarded in terms of policy. It was Russia that was vying for control of central 
Asia. Mulik, the Indian Intelligence Bureau Director throughout Nehru’s term in 
Indian office, states in his memoir, My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal, 
“Britain’s Tibetan Policy was then entirely based on its fears of Russian expansion in 
Central Asia.”3 It was well known that the Russian powers yearned for dominion over 
Asian territory, and had designs on a warm-water port as can be found along India’s 
coast.  
In 1903, Lord Curzon recognized that Tibet was the most likely area for 
Russia to launch an attack on British India.4 Mohan Guruswamy suggests that the 
reason for the Younghusband expedition was specifically to gain military control of 
Tibet to preempt any Russian attempt on the country, which Indian troops 
accomplished, marching all the way to Lhasa. The flight of the thirteenth Dalai Lama 
from Lhasa led the Chinese to assert that he had been deposed, and the British dealt 
primarily with the Chinese amban when creating the Anglo-Tibetan treaty of 1904.5 
This treaty was uniformly regarded as illegal by Tibetans, who remained loyal to the 
Dalai Lama. Even after the Younghusband mission, the British continued to dictate 
border policy between Tibet and India based on the struggle for preeminence in 
central Asia between English and Russian powers. This struggle for power is termed 
“The Great Game.” 
                                                        
3 Mulik, B.N., My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal (Bombay [Mumbai]: Allied Publishers 
Private LTD., 1971), 77. 
4 Guruswamy, Mohan, “India-China Border: Learning from History.” Economic and Political Weekly, 
2003. 38: 39, 4102. 
5 Powers, John, History as Propaganda: Tibetan exiles versus the People's Republic of China (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 82. 
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The British, during the 1800s, were set on creating an authoritative 
demarcation of the boundaries of India, and yet were vague in their position on 
Tibet’s relationship with China. It was in the mid-1800s that the colonial government 
first began trying to outline their border with Tibet. July 1846 marked the first 
boundary commission created by the government.6 Their goal was to define the 
Indian boundary and to create a body of regulations on official trade between India 
and its neighbors. A year later, after the first commission failed to collaborate with 
the Chinese, a second boundary commission was assembled, “for the purpose of 
defining the boundary of the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh and the Emperor of 
China.” In a an 1847 letter, the British Governor-General sent a letter to the High 
Officer in Hong Kong stating, “As I am led to understand, Tibet is immediately under 
the authority of the imperial government of Peking.” This statement shows that, 
although the Governor-General would cater to Chinese sentiments on the ownership 
of Tibet, he was hesitant at best. Still, regardless of polite and placating language, the 
record shows that the Chinese government failed to participate in either of the border 
assessments commissioned by the British. According to Lall, the English Foreign 
Department “emphasized that the international boundary would remain an arbitrary 
one until it had the consent of the Chinese government… it was not enough for the 
Chinese to say, as they had done in the past, that the boundary was a non-issue 
because it was already well-known.”7 
After the first two border commissions were shown to be a failure, the 
colonial powers in India decided to take matters into their own hands. And so, in                                                         
6 Lall, John, Aksai Chin and Sino-Indian Conflict (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1988), 122, 127, 126. 
7 Lall, 169. 
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1855 a man by the name of Montgomerie was chosen to head a team of surveyors to 
map the entire boundary alone.8 After completion, this boundary would be sent to 
Peking to be approved. It was at this time that Montgomerie employed Johnson, a 
man described as “opportunistic,” who had little surveying experience, to survey the 
Ladakh region of India’s border. He concluded his study in 1865, claiming huge 
tracts of land in Aksai Chin equal to around 7,000 square miles, for India.9 According 
to Mohan Guruswamy, Johnson probably had personal reasons for such an ambitious 
claim, as it would have put him in the good graces of the Maharaja. This, in fact, 
worked well for him, and he became the governor of Ladakh. 
Johnson’s survey includes the plateau area between the Karakoram and the 
Kuenlin mountain ranges in Indian territory. Any possible Indian claim to this area 
rests solely on this map. Further, his survey has been called into question, as it may 
have been impossible for him to have covered and surveyed as much area as he 
claimed in the treacherous terrain, requiring a pace of eighteen miles per day.10 In a 
less grandiose claim, Ney Elias, the Joint commissioner of Leh, advocated the use of 
the high-water line in the Karakoram Range as the boundary between India and Tibet 
in 1878.11 He submitted the claim officially in 1890.12 This is the boundary that India 
continues to claim today. Many land borders today are determined by the watershed 
                                                        
8 Lall, 140, 143. 
9 Guruswamy, 4101. 
10 Guruswamy, 4102. 
11 Lall, 164. 
12 Guruswamy, 4102. 
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principle∗, which utilizes the highest line of peaks in a mountain range to divide two 
territories. 
The British government succeeded in speaking directly with the Chinese for 
the first time about the border of Tibet and India in 1890. The Anglo-Chinese 
Convention of 1890 defined the border between Sikkim and Chinese Tibet. Tibetans, 
Alastair writes, “repudiated” the convention, and its findings. 13 Yet, this convention 
and the resulting treaty is most likely the reason that Sikkim is now one of the few 
areas along the Sino-Indian border not disputed. 
 Many of the fringe territories now contested between India and China were 
first contested by Tibet and China. The areas in dispute in the southern part of the 
Tibet region, namely Tawang and Arunachal Pradesh and the entirety of the Manyul 
Area are all “Tibetanoid” in cultural, religious, and individual traits. Yet, these areas 
are remote, and often the people who inhabited them were resistant to any form of 
government.14 Usually, if the people were willing to pay taxes at all, they would pay 
to whichever government required the least tax from them, and consider themselves 
under that government’s protection. 
 Tawang, during the 19th Century, was ruled by local Raja chieftains.15 In 1852 
the Gelong Raja the leader of the seven Rajas, was given the annual payment that he 
received from the British, which ensured uncontested English rights to Assam. Each                                                         
∗The Watershed Principle is termed as such because the rivers, tributaries, and entire water system for 
the area run down these mountain faces, and ownership up to the height of the peaks is a logical 
boundary, and it ensures that a nation will own the entirety of their water system, from beginning to 
end. 
13 Marshall, Julie G., Britain and Tibet 1765-1947 (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), Forward by 
Alastair Lamb, xii. 
14 Akester, Matthew. Interview 15/04/2010. 
15 Lamb, Alastair, The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries (Bath: Pitman 
Press, 1964), 118, 161, 163. 
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year, he sent that payment on to Lhasa. When he failed to do so that year, Tibetan 
troops assembled along their border. Indian troops mobilized to meet them, 
presenting a far larger force than the Tibetans could stand against. Negotiations 
ensued, and it was decided that Tawang was to be considered British territory, but 
Lhasa enjoyed the right to tax the area for many years after this. As late as 1936 Tibet 
was administering and taxing Tawang, although maps and the Simla convention had 
endowed India with its control. India was upset over Tibet’s rule in Tawang, but was 
unwilling to take any action in the area. As for China, regardless of the fact that Lhasa 
collected taxes from these areas, China’s Manchu government still considered these 
areas, as the rest of Tibet, to be Chinese, not Tibetan. 
 
The Simla Convention 
 In April of 1914, delegates of the British, Chinese, and Tibetan conferences 
met to discuss the boundaries of the Tibetan nation. Neville Maxwell notes in his 
article, “Deadlocked Deadlock: The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute,” that Simla was 
set up as the British brokering the conversation to define the border between Tibet 
and China.16 This point is often lost, as the Simla Convention is now often discussed 
only in terms of the Indian and Chinese border. In spite of this, the existence of a 
Tibetan nation would preclude the existence of any such border, as both countries 
would border Tibet, and not each other. China wished to divide the Tibetan region 
into two areas, and the British acknowledged the Eastern part of Tibet as a province 
                                                        
16 Maxwell, Neville, “The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute.” Economic and Political Weekly, 1981. 16: 
38, 1546. 
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of China.17 The discussion at Simla was centered around the line between Tibet and 
China. The Kuomintang (Nationalist) Government in China was so weak that they 
were willing to discuss the border with Tibet, even though they continued to claim 
that Tibet in its entirety was a part of China. 
 The Tibetan, British and Chinese delegates initialed the Simla convention 
document of the 27th of April, 1914.18 The endorsement reads: “We herby initial in 
token of our acceptance, this 27th day of April, 1914 (i) A.H.M. British 
Plenipotentiary (ii) Ivan Chen, Chinese Plenipotentiary (iii) Lonchen Shatra Tibetan 
Plenipotentiary (Tibetan script).1920 On July 3rd, China repudiated the action of Ivan 
Chen, both his signature and his acquiescence to any form of Tibetan autonomy.21 
That same day, upon the Chinese refusal to ratify the document, Henry McMahon and 
the Tibetan representative, Lonchen Shatra, initialed a second convention. The 
Chinese were denied any rights under the convention until they acquiesced to the 
terms. As such, because they failed to sign, Britain and Tibet no longer acknowledged 
any Chinese relationship with Tibet, including suzerainty, and Tibet became a free 
nation. 
 Maxwell accuses the British of claiming to be an innocent third party wanting 
only to help the conversations of Simla, but then using the opportunity to illegally 
annex territory. This is a strange claim, as Britain had no interest in holding any 
official power in Tibet, and actually preferred it to remain an autonomous buffer 
state. In fact, when the 13th Dalai Lama asked Sir Charles Bell to induce the British                                                         
17 Thupten Samphel, Interview 17/4/2010. 
18 See Appendix C. 19 See Map 1 
20 Lall, map opposite 226. 
21 Lamb, 51. 
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Government to control, and thereby protect Tibet, in a similar relationship that Britain 
had with India.22 This was declined, though the British still expressed interest in 
keeping up a relationship with Lhasa. Futher convoluting Maxwell’s claim, the areas 
which Tibet gave to British India were well outside of Chinese control, thousands of 
miles away from the closest Chinese-administered area. Maxwell also asserts that 
Olaf Caroe, a Delhi official in 1935, falsified the published record of the Simla 
conference to give the impression that all parties agreed. 23 Maxwell, however, makes 
this statement without citing any evidence or naming any concurring scholars. 
 Another charge is leveled at the British in their actions at the Simla 
conference by Alastair Lamb. He references Article 3 of the Anglo-Russian 
Convention, which stated that neither the British nor the Russians could send 
representatives to Lhasa. This convention is unrelated to the one held at Simla, 
however, and even the Chinese government rarely cites it as one of their reasons to 
void the events at Simla. The Russians did not record any protest, and considering the 
fact that the Chinese sent a representative to meet the British one at Lhasa, clearly 
they were not too offended by the apparent breach of the Anglo-Russian Convention, 
either. 
 The Tibetans heralded the events of 1914 as the Tibetan declaration of 
independence. Yet, it is remembered now as the event where the McMahon Line was 
born, and where the British finally, after decades of trying, demarcated their boundary 
with Tibet. This line followed the watershed principle, using the highest peaks in the 
border region as the outline for the division. It can also be guessed that, although                                                         
22 Ghosh, S., Truth about the McMahon Line (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1977), 38. 
23 Maxwell, Neville, “The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute.” Economic and Political Weekly, 1981. 16: 
38, 1546. 
  15 
areas such as Tawang were close with Tibet in culture, and historically paid taxes to 
Lhasa, they were given to the British Government in hopes that the British would 
continue to offer Tibet protection from the Chinese. When the British ended their 
colonial rule of India in 1947, the entire Asian dynamic was thrown askew. The major 
lasting legacy of the Simla conference was the McMahon line, which continues to be 
the line that India claims as the boundary between India and China today. 
 
The Occupation of Tibet 
 After the Chinese occupation of Tibet beginning in 1950, China and India 
faced a problem they had never encountered before: the delimitation of a border 
between India and China. By the end of the Manchu dynasty, the Chinese government 
was politically incorporating Tibet into the provincial structure.24 Yet, because they 
lacked any political or military clout in Lhasa, there was no Chinese-Indian border 
ever delimited. Chinese presence in Tibet was almost entirely lost after the Simla 
conference declared complete Tibetan autonomy. Still, China was set on including 
Tibet within the limits of the motherland. The Chinese government was aware of 
British and Russian powers vying for the control of central Asia, and their discomfort 
with the untimely weakness of China in this period caused them to claim the territory. 
It was a desperate façade of strength: China was hoping to show that she was a still a 
true power in south Asia after losing Manchuria to Japan. 
 Britain, during the 19th century, had been trying to use both sides of the 
Tibetan issue to their advantage, keeping China happy by not contesting their claim in 
Tibet, while still dealing directly with Lhasa and ensuring her safety as a buffer state.                                                         
24 Lamb, 30. 
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The British ended this policy early in the 20th century, and officially recognized Tibet 
as independent from China. China was in no way capable of contesting Tibet’s 
independence militarily, especially with the promise of British support in retaliation 
to any threat. Yet, once British colonial rule of India ended in 1947, Mao Zedong was 
quick to invade. On the first of January, 1950, Mao made his first announcement 
declaring his desire to “liberate” the people of Tibet from “imperialist aggression.” 
When Tibetan resistance had been suppressed, and the 17-Point Agreement25 was 
signed, India reacted. 
 Mulik makes it very clear in his memoir that India’s interest lay in keeping 
Tibet between India and China. It was a traditional British buffer state, and though the 
new Indian government did not have the military power that Great Britain wielded to 
protect Tibet, it was widely acknowledged that the best way to ensure Indian security 
was to keep a buffer between her and China. Literature about this time period in Sino-
Indian relations is almost entirely uniform in its criticism of Nehru for allowing 
China’s takeover of Tibet. Mulik alone defends Nehru, stating that he was in no 
position to fight with the Chinese militarily, and fighting for Tibetan independence 
ideologically brought forth the danger of calling the McMahon line into question.26 In 
retrospect, questioning the Chinese invasion of Tibet held no bearing on whether or 
not they would accept the McMahon line. Not knowing this at the time, Nehru 
engaged in a strategy of appeasing the Chinese government regarding their 
occupation of India’s northern neighbor. 
                                                        
25 See Appendix D. 
26 Mulik, 76. 
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 Nehru was a believer in a policy of non-alignment with any country as a 
measure to ensure the safety of India.27 But Nehru’s nervousness that came with 
Chinese presence just above the McMahon Line was apparent in his speeches. In the 
early 50s, his public talks showed his inability to define Tibet’s status as a country. 
Nehru said, “Tibet is not the same as China,” in December 1950. However vague this 
statement may be, his position would only become less evident in the next years. In 
one 1951 speech, Nehru actually said first that Tibet was historically independent, but 
also that it was always an integral part of China.28 He was floundering between trying 
to limit China’s aggression and keeping open the possibility of a free Tibet, but also 
hoping to keep Peking happy with his actions.  Mulik wrote that Nehru was timid 
when it came to speaking out about Tibet partially because he did not want China to 
become suspicious that he, too, had designs on Tibet.29 
 The Panchsheel Pact of 1954 was Nehru’s decisive action on the matter. It 
was a trade agreement between India and China about trade with the Tibetan region, 
signed on April 29th.30 It provided that Tibet was an inextricable part of China. And 
so, where British India had been the champion of Tibetan independence, India under 
Nehru recognized Chinese sovereignty over the whole of Tibet. This was a 
historically unprecedented event. Lhasang Tsering (Lha bsang Tse ring), former 
president of the Tibetan Youth Congress (1986-90), said that this was allowed to 
happen because “China under Mao had yet to show their true colors.31” He believes 
                                                        
27 Mankekar, D.R. The Guilty Men of 1962 (New Delhi: Tulsi Shah Enterprises, 1968), 2-3, 10. 
28 “India’s Foreign Policy.” Selected Speeches: Prime Minister Nehru, 1946-51. 341. 
29 Mulik, 78. 
30 Mankekar, 12. 
31 Lhasang Tsering, Interview 24/04/10. 
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India considered bilateral relations with China more important than their policy on 
Tibet. 
 Nehru was “shocked” to hear that Chinese armies were marching into Tibet.32 
He thought to ensure India’s standing in Mao’s eyes by affirming Chinese action in 
Tibet with the Panchsheel Pact. It was yet another surprise to him when, despite the 
Panchsheel Pact, Chinese Prime minister Chou En-Lai began to bring questions forth 
as to the where division between their two countries truly lay. 
 
Maps and Letters 
 On July 17th, 1954, China sent correspondence to India stating that Indian 
patrols had been sighted by the Chinese army, and that these were a violation of the 
Chinese border in the Wu-je area.33 India wrote that it was aware of no border 
incursions on their part, but that Chinese troops had been seen within Indian territory 
in the Hoti Plain. The two countries would soon find out that Chinese Wu-je and the 
Indian Hoti Plain evidently overlap. Both countries agreed to examine their borders, 
and Nehru travelled to China to question “inaccurate maps” being published in the 
mainland.34 1955 was characterized by silence on the border issue, while Chinese 
military strength in the region grew. In 1956, India finally broke the silence, and 
Nehru warned that Indian border guards were instructed to defend against 
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33 Gopal, Ram, India China Tibet Triangle (Rajendra Shukla. Lucknow: 1964), 76. 
34 Stahnke, Arthur A. "The Place of International Law in Chinese Strategy and Tactics: The Case of the 
Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute.” The Journal of Asian Studies, 1970. 30: 1, 96. 
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intrusions.35 China agreed to stop sending troops in Wu-je until the dispute was 
settled. 
 Yet, between the years of 1956 and 1958, no settlement could be achieved. 
Exaspirated, Nehru wrote a letter to Chou En-Lai dated 1958 that read, “Our 
boundaries [with Tibet] were quite clear and were not a matter of argument. You 
were good enough to reply to me [in regard to the 1954 meeting on inaccurate maps] 
that these maps were really reproductions of old pre-liberation maps and that you had 
had not time to revise them.36” He was referencing the November Memorandum, 
which stated (p. 104), “ The Chinese Government has not yet undertaken a survey of 
China’ boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned and… it will not make 
changes in the boundary on its own.” 
 This was patently false. Over the next year, Chou En-lai put forward a wealth 
of maps, each pushing the border further inside traditional Indian territory. The 
Chinese discussed the boundary shifting as a “rectification of unequal treaties.” 
Mankekar describes this as “cartographic aggression.”37 There is a well-documented 
history of Chinese maps extending the Sino claim to land in India. Mulik talks about 
Chou En-lai’s letter of 1960, in which the border was pushed even further west and 
south than the map proposed in 1956 after the Wu-je incident.38 He also attributes to 
Chou’s government, “classic instances of deliberate vagueness indulged in by the 
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Chinese while defining their various shifting lines with a view to exploit it for future 
maneuvers on the ground.39” 
 For many years, the British maps showed the lines proposed by Johnson.40 
These were by far the most ambitious claim ever set forth by the British or Indian 
governments, and were largely replaced after the Simla conference. This is the basic 
area of discrepancy in the cartographic record of the British. 
 The cartographic record of China, on the other hand, is messy at best, and 
rather than being based in history, deliberately flies in the face of historical 
documentation. In the words of Nehru, “The Government of China… not only [does] 
not accept incontrovertible facts, but disregards major frontier agreements by 
untenable interpretations of their terms or by questioning their validity.41” 
 The Sino-Indian border can be divided into three areas: The Eastern, Middle, 
and Western Sectors. The Eastern Sector42 includes Monyul, Loyal and Lower 
Tsayul. These areas are commonly referred to as Arunachal Pradesh or NEFA (the 
North East Frontier Agency), with an especially important area known as Tawang 
contained within. The Chinese argument solely cites a letter from a Raja chief about 
“friendly relations between the Government of India and our Lhasa Government” to 
show Tibetan rule.43 India, conversely, cites ten separate documents stating the 
historical Indian jurisdiction up to the McMahon Line. One of these documents is the 
Tibet-Ladakh Agreement of 1684∗.44 The Dogra – Ladakh engagement of 1842 
                                                        
39 Mulik, 253. 
40 Lamb, 84. 
41 Stahnke, 109. 42 See Map 2. 
43 Gopal, 123, 125-6. 
∗ Some sources refer to this as an 1683 treaty, while others use 1684 or 1687 as the date. 
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confirmed the boundary.45 The treaty was further re-affirmed by notes exchanged 
between the British and the Chinese in 1846 and 1847. Another British note dated 
1899 re-stated British ownership of Aksai Chin. 
 As for the Middle Sector46, Gopal writes, “Unlike the Indian side, the Chinese 
side did not produce any documentary material to support their claim, but seemed to 
believe that their critical examination of the Indian material suggesting its refutation 
would be enough proof in their favour.47” The middle sector is defined by no major 
official treaties, but has been under Indian administration since the late 17th 
Century.48 
 The Western Sector49 is in the Indian area known as Ladakh. Aksai Chin is on 
the western frontier. Alastair Lamb tells that in the Western Sector, the “extent of 
Chinese claims seem to increase slightly from time to time.50” The main delineation 
of the Western Sector is the Simla Convention. On the Chinese side, the boundary is 
demarcated in an 1877 map by a man named Walker.51 India insists that Walker drew 
the line where he believed the water-parting was, but because he had never visited the 
area and knew nothing about it, he mistakenly drew it into Indian territory. 
 India puts forth very strong case for her claim to the boundaries, noting 
historical documents and clearly defined maps. The Chinese case rests almost entirely 
on the refutation of the Indian case. Mulik’s memoir explains, “The Chinese would 
point to an area of an antiquated map to define the border, but would reject the border                                                         
44 See Appendix A. 
45 Lamb, 11. 46 See Map 4, showing the entire Northern Frontier. 
47 Gopal, 129. 
48 Lamb, 11. 49 See Map 3. 
50 Lamb, 7. 
51 Gopal, 169. 
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outlined in other areas of the map.52 He goes on to write that the Chinese were 
exploiting the fact that the line was not physically drawn on the ground to create an 
impression that the border did not exist at all. However, there was a demarcation put 
in place in 1892.53 The Chinese had erected a boundary pillar at the summit of the 
Karakoram Range. Clearly, at this time, the Chinese believed this to be the border 
between India and Tibet. 
 China’s tack is that the border between the two countries was never 
historically delimited, and that it must follow the traditional lines set in place by 
cultural similarity and the tax records of Lhasa. Here, the Chinese argument is 
confounded by the question of Tibet’s nationhood. If cultural continuity is to be used 
as the argument for Chinese rule beyond the high watershed, then one must recognize 
that the culture of these people is similar to those who reside in Lhasa, and is 
extremely dissimilar from Han Chinese. Similarly, if the tax record is used, then 
China must acknowledge that Lhasa was a government capable of taxing its people 
without any permission from the Chinese powers, and their tax records are 
permissible as evidence of their border, then the “One China” policy fails to ring true. 
Still, to say that a government’s tax records are conclusive, but to negate the treaties 
in which they have entered into to define their border is duplicitous. 
 In 1959, Chou En-lai sent a letter to the Indian ambassador in China stating 
that the entire border had not be historically delimited and that it must be 
negotiated.54 Nehru’s response was that China was “contesting the facts of history.” 
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Chou fired back that he understood the existence of the McMahon Line, but that it 
was an illegal boundary set up by British colonialists seeking more power in Asia. He 
claimed solidarity with India in that both countries were victims of “imperialist 
aggression” which should cause them to view the border in the same way, as a relic of 
said aggression.55 Chou claimed that where understanding was in order, Nehru was 
trying to use Britain’s illegal oppression to his advantage. China defined the entire 
Simla Conference as “an important step taken by Britain in its design to detach Tibet 
from China.56” Nehru asked China why they did not bring up the border question in 
the 1954 agreement57. Chou En-Lai responded that “conditions were not yet ripe,” 
and admitted that the Chinese had “had no time to study the border question.” Later, 
on December 8, 1959, Chou En-lai wrote a letter to Nehru claiming 50,000 square 
miles of previously Indian territory.58 In an additional embarrassment, China 
completed the construction of a road in Aksai Chin in 1957, without the Indian 
Government’s knowledge. There was no official Indian statement on the road until 
1959. 
 The map war continued into 1960. A February 12th note from New Delhi 
referenced one of China’s own maps to prove the Indian case. An official Chinese 
Postal map published in 1917 showed the McMahon Line to be the boundary between 
India and Tibet.59 As Mulik puts it, “Most of India’s case could be proved from the 
Chinese maps and material produced by the Chinese themselves.60” China failed to 
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respond to the existence of this map, citing in retaliation a 1958 map by British 
scholar John Bartholomew that denotes the boundary under the qualification 
“Disputed Area.61” Of course, there was no question of the fact that there was a 
border dispute between the two countries as of 1958. The use of this map by the 
Chinese as evidence of their claim on the land is circular reasoning, and renders logic 
useless in examining it. 
 Tensions continued to rise between the leaders of the two countries. 
Essentially, the only border upon which the two could agree was the one between 
Tibet and a small, Indian-controlled state called Sikkim, which was chosen in 1890.62 
In 1960, China and Burma were able to resolve their border, which they defined along 
the McMahon line drawn out in Simla.63 In 1961, China used the high watershed 
principle to divide Nepal and China, which is the same method used to mark the line 
between Sikkim and China. It seemed that everywhere, China was solving border 
disputes, and, in many cases, was willing to use the exact same types of lines and 
demarcations with other countries that she was unwilling to use with India. In the 
Indian dispute, neither side would make any concessions along what her proposed 
border was. The tension broke in 1962, when true hostilities began. 
 
The Sino-Indian War 
 The Sino-Indian war is one of the more embarrassing events of India’s past. 
They were handily defeated by the Chinese, who used their superior military might to 
show who was truly in control at the negotiating table. Mankekar’s book, The Guilty  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Men of 1987, provides one of the most comprehensive views of this war. Mankekar 
suggests that the Chinese easily defeated India because of superior intelligence.64 
Chinese spies actually infiltrated groups of Tibetan refugees crossing into India, and 
remained in the disputed regions to examine the land. India, during this time, detected 
multiple incursions to Indian airspace, which were presumably Chinese 
reconnaissance missions to photograph the topography. The Indians counted 102 
Chinese airspace violations between 1950 and 1960. The aircraft were known to be 
taking off from Lhasa. Not only had the Chinese quickly seen to the construction of 
air bases in Lhasa, but they also had an estimated 200,000 troops stationed in Tibet.  
 All this served to make Nehru quite nervous. Earlier, because of its policy of 
non-alignment, India felt safe, and the army lost funding. Military training, 
equipment, troop numbers – each lagged behind as Nehru tried to focus the Indian 
economy elsewhere.65 After the Second World War, India was under the impression 
that nuclear deterrence would prevent all war. By 1960, it was becoming more and 
more apparent that armed conflict was looming close.  
 In March of 1960, China made an economic aid agreement with Nepal. The 
Chinese Government began to build roads into Nepal. Mulik concludes that China 
was attempting to convince Nepal that she was no longer economically dependent 
upon India, and was wooing her away from allegiance with India.66 Beyond this, 
India began seeing signs of Chinese encroachment on the border, and in March of 
1961, began preparing for war. Between 1959 and 1961, China had “annexed over 
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2,000 square miles of territory in Northern Ladakh.67” Considering this, it is 
surprising that the war began as late as it did. A December 1961 note from New Delhi 
showed Nehru growing impatient and hostile.68 He wrote that it “ill-behooves the 
Chinese Government to ask the government of Inida to desist from taking measures to 
safeguard its territorial integrity.” He goes on to suggest a Chinese military 
withdrawal to allow negotiations to take place.  
 Still antagonizing Nehru, on May 3rd, 1962, China and Pakistan began 
discussions on aligning the Indian border, a process which New Delhi, of course, 
protested as illegal.69 It was later in 1962 that India initiated the “Forward Policy.70” 
The idea was to establish posts both North and South of the Chinese position in an 
attempt to cut off supplies to these positions. China was mired in the disastrous 
aftermath of the Great Leap Forward and at the same time was dealing with the threat 
of a Taiwanese invasion and a war-by-proxy in Laos. Because of these factors, on 
June 26th, Lt. General Kaul wrote that, despite the Chinese infantry build-up, “I am 
convinced that the Chinese will not attack any of our positions, even if they are 
relatively weaker than theirs.71” General Cariappa, rather than surmising on whether 
or not China would attack, looked at the situation more practically. He believed that 
war would be disastrous for the Indian army, because no troops could be spared from 
the fighting in Kashmir72. Beyond that, Indian troops were neither trained nor 
equipped for high-altitude combat.  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 Though the first shots had been fired in 1959, when Chinese troops fired upon 
an Indian position in the Kongka Pass, it was the Forward Policy that was the 
beginning of the 1962 war.73 Bejing, as a reaction to the forward policy, issued a 30-
day ultimatum to India to desist from moving into what they considered to be Chinese 
territory.74 When Nehru refused to withdraw, the PLA easily destroyed the Indian 
troops stationed along the border. 
 The quick defeat had shaken Nehru. He had realized that his military prowess 
was not equal to that of China, but it was inconceivable that China had dislodged his 
armies so easily. New Delhi offered to allow the Aksai Chin road to continue to exist 
for civilian use only, if hostilities could be ended.75 China wanted more. Chou En-lai 
was prepared to accommodate India along the NEFA border if India would accept the 
actual line of control in Ladakh. According to Mankekar, this was “a proposal that 
should have made sense to any realist.” Nehru, however, rejected it because of 
popular pressure not to yield to Chinese aggression. He told a protest that had 
gathered outside of his house that he vowed to preserve for India what was India’s. 
 It was not until August 17th that Indian troops were actually authorized to fire 
at Chinese troops when fired upon.76 It did little good. China used a military 
technique in which it would strike unexpectedly until India was ready to defend, but 
then would call a ceasefire. They would merely beat back the Indian army, and then 
withdraw entirely from an area before the Indian army could focus its forces on the 
area. Thupten Samphel (Thup bsdan Bsam phel), the Secretary of the Department of 
                                                        
73 Maxwell, 1981. 1547. 
74 Robinson, 511, 513. 
75 Mankekar, 25, 31. 
76 Mankekar, 41. 
  28 
Information and International Relations (DIIR) in the Tibetan Government in-exile, 
believes that China “felt that keeping Indian territory was not sustainable, so they 
withdrew.77” China believed that the local people might revolt against their rule. It is 
because of this fear of local people favoring the Indian government that anti-Indian 
propaganda was spread throughout Tibet at the time.78 Upon the military capture of 
Tawang, the Chinese employed their Silver Dollar Campaign for the short time they 
were there. This was a campaign familiar to Tibetans, in which the Chinese 
Government shamelessly handed out Silver Dollars to civilians to literally buy their 
affections and increase Chinese popularity.  
 Mankekar describes the Sino-Indian war as a “war in which everything went 
awry for India.79” According to General Kaul, Indian equipment was defective and 
the Indian army was ill prepared for mountain warfare. A lack of intelligence stopped 
India from using the air force for support because they had exaggerated the Chinese 
ability to retaliate in the air. The U.S., Britain and Australia had begun to offer India 
military aid just before the Chinese called a ceasefire. 
 The November 1962 ceasefire was entirely to the Chinese advantage. It 
allowed China to pose as though it merely defended its borders, and kept them from 
losing their military advantage in the snows that would disrupt communication and 
perhaps could even the odds between the two militaries.80 On December 10th through 
December 12th, 1962, the six “non-aligned nations” of Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, UAR and Ghana held a conference with the intent of promoting a ceasefire 
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and peaceful negotiation between China and India.81 The Chinese first acknowledged 
the need for the Colombo Conference and claimed a “positive response” to the idea of 
a resolution.82 The Colombo proposals went on to state that regardless of the quibble 
about history, that the McMahon Line was the line of actual control, and because of 
this it was the most appropriate boundary. At that revelation, China no longer 
acknowledged the Colombo Six to be a valid international body capable of resolving 
the conflict. 
 The Colombo Conferences represent the closest the situation has ever come to 
a resolution. Though the violence along the Sino-Indian border has stopped, it 
remains undefined and a constant source of tension between the two most populous 
nations on the earth. The person who is usually singled out and blamed for the 
conflict and the war that ensued is Nehru. Mankekar sums up Nehru’s view in his 
quote, “Jawaharlal Nehru had convinced himself and his country that in the post-War 
nuclear era, with the United Nations keeping law and order in the world, war was not 
only outmoded but had ceased to be an instrument of policy, and that personal 
diplomacy was the new instrument.83” Nehru’s policy was doubtlessly flawed. Yet, a 
new administration for India did not mean that the problems of the old administration 
would disappear. The border conflict promised to be an Asian problem for years to 
come. 
 
Present  
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 The Sino-Indian border debate is a persistent one. It is over 50 years old, now, 
and there is little being done in the modern arena to see its resolution. Today, China 
has amicably settled almost every one of its disputed borders with the exception of 
India.84 Its problem with the Indian border runs deeper than just the political 
gerrymandering of a line. Robinson agrees, giving his opinion in his book Chinese 
Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice: “Chinese leaders tend to internalize a sense of 
historical resentment at the raw deal which history has given them. The resentment 
often translates into a claim of entitlement upon others.85” This resentment led to their 
claim upon a helpless Tibet. It is this sense of bullying that keeps them in conflict 
with India. Upon India’s acceptance of Tibet as a part of China, China immediately 
challenged India in other territorial arenas, as if to find how far they could push into 
Indian territory without resistance.  
 China pushing into Indian territory has already led to war once. It will not be 
altogether surprising if war should break out again. Data taken by Stephen Kocs 
between 1945 and 1987 in his study for College of the Holy Cross suggests that the 
best way to determine whether or not war will occur is the existence of disputed 
territory.86 The international legal bodies have inhibited the use of wars for territorial 
gain since World War II, and so the main cause of war since 1945 has been territorial 
dispute. In fact, war is over 3,300 percent more likely between two states that have a 
border dispute that has never been resolved than for two states that have well-defined 
boundaries. 
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 Recent years have marked an acceptance of the fact that the border is not 
delimited. In 1992 Chinese legislation began to permit trade with India through the 
border, though it remained unresolved.87 Still, this is not to say that this acceptance of 
reality is complacent. Emotions still run high over the ambiguity of the border. 
 Trade between India and China was worth $38 Billion in 2007.88 And so, 
economically, China and India can be seen to be allies. This is the reason for the 
pragmatic decision in 1992 to allow transit through the border, though it is still a 
matter of severe discord between the two nations. Militarily, the two are caught in an 
arms race that is similar to a modern-day cold war.  
 India has, since 1962, drastically increased its defense spending and military 
capability.89 In 1964, China completed their first nuclear test. Ten years later, India 
finally began her first. 90 Again, India in 1998 held nuclear tests. The prime minister 
told President Clinton that Chinese aggression was the main reason.91 
 The amount of disputed territory is incredibly large. Other than Himachal 
Pradesh and Utter Pradesh, the main dispute is over 16,000 square miles of 
uninhabited territory in Ladakh, as well as 35,000 square miles of NEFA, which is 
populated throughout.92 The Ladakhi territory may be uninhabited, but it has 
traditionally been used for mining in the rich salt mines there.  
 Now, in the absence of actual violence, a political contest is constantly being 
held for control over the areas. In 2008 the Indian Prime Minister, Singh, visited  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Arunachal Pradesh, infuriating the Chinese.93 The Indian side often uses its de facto 
control over the area to needle the Chinese, or at least just to demonstrate its inclusion 
on the Indian side of the border. One place in which this is especially evident is in 
Tawang. 
 Tawang lies in Arunachal Pradesh, just below the McMahon Line. There is an 
extremely important Buddhist monastery there, which is the birthplace of the Sixth 
Dalai Lama. The Chinese claim Tawang because the sixth Dalai Lama was born 
there.94 Yet, somehow, recognition of Dalai Lama as Tibet’s central figure does not 
translate into the recognition of Tibet as a separate entity from China. Tawang lies in 
the foothills south of the Himalayas, below the high watershed line. Guruswamy 
writes, “Any claim that they [the Chinese] might have on the Tawang Tract is 
rendered invalid in the sense that it becomes a geographical anachronism,” 
referencing the distance from Mainland China and the high watershed.95 Because of 
the de facto boundary on the McMahon line, Tawang lies squarely within India. 
 The holiness of the Tawang temple has prompted the Dalai Lama to visit on 
multiple occasions. Most recently, he visited on November 8, 2009. The Chinese 
government protested loudly. According to the Tibetan Review, “For India, permitting 
the visit was an act of asserting its sovereignty over the territory.” The Chinese 
powers were not impressed. A Chinese international newspaper said that India proved 
it had not “learned [sic] its lessons from [the] 1962 war” in allowing the Dalai Lama 
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to visit Arunachal Pradesh.96 The Minister of the State of External Affairs, Sashi 
Tharoor, called this charge “silly” and went on to say, “We are not woefully prepared 
as we were in 1962, and such language will not help.” Though the Chinese 
government has claimed Tawang since the 1950s, the fact that they are not supported 
by Tawang locals keeps their claim at bay. During the Sino-Indian war, they had 
actually occupied Tawang for a short time, threatening Calcutta as the next target, but 
they quickly disembarked back across the McMahon Line. 
 Though the Dalai Lama usually refrains from making any political 
commentary, he stated “My stand that Tawang is an integral part of India has not 
changed. 97” Including this 2009 visit, the Dalai Lama has visited Tawang five times 
since coming into exile, in 1983, 1997, and twice in 2003. This recent visit was the 
first time the Chinese Government protested. Assuredly, from this point onward, it 
will not let such visits go by uncontested. 
 Though India controls most of the area that is claimed, China’s clout in the 
area is unparalleled. The Chinese Government feels free to use that clout to pressure 
India in ways other than open military aggression. Since the late ‘50s, China has 
exercised a policy of isolating India by befriending India’s land neighbors. Mankekar 
notes that around the 1962 war, China was making a “special effort to cultivate 
Nepal” with money, trade agreements, and promises of development and the training 
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of technicians.98 At this time, Nepal and China also came to their border agreement, 
which placed the once bitterly contested Everest peak inside Nepal. 
 China was also clearly trying to isolate India when it befriended Burma in 
1959.99 On India’s west side lies Pakistan. Sino-Pakistani relations are impeccable, 
and China is always quick to defend Pakistan whenever her border and India’s come 
into question. In 1965, Chou En-Lai went so far as to promise to open a front with 
Sikkim if India did not desist in their bid for Kashmir. Now, forty-five percent of 
Kashmir is in India’s control. Pakistan holds about 35 percent, and the remaining 
twenty percent is occupied by China.100 Still, despite China’s “strategic markers of 
encirclement,” India continues to support Chinese policies such as the One China 
policy.101 
 China has between 300 thousand and 500 thousand troops stationed in Tibet, 
the vast majority of them lining the Indian border.102 There are fourteen military 
airfields in Tibet being used by China. There are 8 missile bases with an impressive 
range of missiles capable of reaching Indian targets. Beyond this, the Tibetan rail 
project poses a serious threat for India.103 It would allow for the easy movement of 
Chinese troops directly to the Indian border. Ecologically, the dumping of nuclear 
waste in Tibet has the potential to pollute Indian rivers. It is little-known that China 
uses Tibet as a dumping grounds for nuclear waste. But, the fact is, China actually 
offers to sell Uranium to countries, and as a further incentive, promises to take back  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the waste, which most countries do not know what to do with.104 Whether or not 
China is respecting international standards for how to deal with nuclear waste is 
anybody’s guess, as the entire Tibet area is not open to survey or inspection. 
 Again, Tibet proves to be at the heart of the entire conflict. Though it is an oft-
overlooked fact, there simply would be no border issues between China and India 
were Tibet still to exist. Yet, without Tibet functioning in its colonialist-era role as a 
buffer state, two of the major powers in Asia have now collided, and the friction on 
the border remains a concern for the entire continent. 
 
The Tibet Issue 
 The “One-China Policy” utilized by China is a direct response to the natural 
questions that arise from the country’s occupation of Tibet. Any country that enters 
into any type of agreement or relationship with China must first accept the terms of 
the One-China Policy. Tibet proves to be an insecurity for the massive country, even 
50 years after full Chinese occupation took place. 
 The Issue of Tibet is, similarly, still close to India’s heart. Indian 
Parliamentarian Arun Shaurie stated that “India’s security is inextricably tied up in 
the existence and survival of Tibet as a buffer state.105” It was a major failing of 
Nehru’s to let Tibet be taken over by a powerful nation like China. When the British 
left India to become an independent nation in 1947, India was faced with a choice: to 
continue playing the Great Game, or to become the little brother of a better-
established state. Nehru did neither. The result was a war that left India, and Indian                                                         
104 Lhasang Tsering, Interview 24/04/10. 
105 Malone, 138, 146. 
  36 
pride, badly bruised. Now, India finds itself surrounded by countries with grudges 
against it, and nearly no strong allies. Putting Tibet’s role in Sino-Indian relations in 
even stronger terms, Indian analyst P.C. Chakravarti said, “Any strong expansionist 
power, entrenched in Tibet, holds in its hands a loaded pistol aimed at the heart of 
India.106” Nehru had deluded himself into thinking that the Chinese intrusion into 
Lhasa, despite the bloody evidence, was “grossly exaggerated,” and “more a clash of 
wills at present than a clash of arms or physical bodies.107” His deliberate ignorance 
of the facts came with a heavy price not only for Tibetans, but later, in 1962, for India 
as well. 
 As for the Tibetan community, many of those exiled currently live in India. 
Tibet has set up an entire government-in-exile to handle Tibetan affairs and to keep 
the Tibetan identity alive. Tsewang Rigzin (Tse dbang Rig ‘zhin), the leader of one of 
the bodies of the government, the Tibetan Youth Congress, disagrees with any kind of 
discussion on the border conflict, because he believes China does not have the 
authority to discuss the Tibetan border issue with the Indian government.108 However, 
in the Department of Information and International Relations, the leaders agree, 
“mutual suspicion is hampering the speedy resolution of the issue of Tibet,” and 
believe that a calm, amicable and well-reasoned approach to the disputed border will 
bring about a better outcome for Tibet and Tibetan people.109  
 But this approach, which assumes the humanitarian agenda will be carried out, 
is considered by some to be unrealistic. A very simple, honest view on the issue of 
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Tibet was put forth by Giri Lal Jain at the conference held at the Indian International 
Centre on October third, 1965. Jain said, “The Tibetan issue is far from closed, and 
will not be solved till either of two conditions are fulfilled: 1) Tibet becomes 
independent again or 2) the Tibetan people are really swamped by Han 
immigration.110” The latter of the two is being realized in Tibet today. According to 
Tsewang Rigzin, Chinese policies are very clear in their intent to destroy Tibet and 
Tibetan people. Every day the railway is used to bring more Han Chinese into Tibet, 
and returns, taking Tibet’s natural resources back to the mainland. 
 China’s political history in Tibet begins roughly in 1720, when Manchu forces 
rescued the 13th Dalai Lama from Dzangor Tribesmen, and place him back in 
Lhasa.111 Since then, Chinese representatives have continuously been present in 
Lhasa. Yet, it was not until the beginning of the 20th Century that the Chinese made 
any attempt to directly control and administer Tibet. Gopal notes in his book India 
China Tibet Triangle that Tibet had enjoyed the right to sign treaties for 300 years 
before 1950, and dealt directly with neighbors on border issues.112 He cites not only 
the 1684 treaty with Ladakh, but also an 1856 Tibetan treaty with Nepal, recognized 
by the People’s Government of China. 
 In Chou En-lai’s own words in a 1959 note to the Indian Embassy in China, 
he claims territory below the McMahon line because “in the middle of the 
seventeenth century, when the fifth Dalai Lama unified Tibet,” Tibet had exercised 
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jurisdiction over the areas.113 This is a plain acknowledgement of the leadership of the 
Dalai Lama and the uninhibited governmental rule of Tibet by Tibetans. 
 But Tibet would not survive without the British to support them against the 
growing Chinese power. On October the 7th, 1950, China invaded Tibet for the first 
time after Tibet had declared its independence.114 Though it was Britain that helped 
Tibet to declare its independence from China in 1914, after China had invaded, the 
British blocked Tibet’s humanitarian and political case against the Chinese from 
being heard in the U.N.115 Sadly, because Tibet is a small nation far removed from the 
hotbeds of political scheming, a nation that was disinterested in war and power 
struggle, no country found it politically necessary to come forward in Tibet’s defense. 
Yet, without having ever been politically involved itself, Tibet could be the key to 
peace throughout Asia. 
 
Analysis 
 The situation surrounding the border between India and China is simply a 
matter of Realpolitik. Morality, idealism, and justice play no part in the interactions 
between the two nations. It is merely guided by the principles of national interest. 
 China claims areas beyond the high water line because it is in her interest to 
do so, not because of any historical record. China is an extremely powerful nation, 
but the government of China is consistent in showing their discomfort with their place 
on the international stage and their need to assert themselves. “In the case of 
Vietnam,” Neville Maxwell, a China scholar who leans heavily in the favor of China  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in the border case, writes, “China, under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, used a trivial 
boundary dispute as a pretext for an attack intended to teach a lesson – the lesson 
being that Chinese Hegemony must be accepted.116” Though Maxwell admits that the 
Chinese acted irresponsibly and irrationally in the Vietnam case, he claims that this is 
a singular black mark on China’s foreign policy record. Yet, he uses the word 
“hegemony,” meaning absolute dominion over all countries in a region. It follows, 
then, that China would have to repeat this action elsewhere in South Asia, in order to 
teach its lesson of unquestioned dominance. India is a prime candidate to be a 
recipient of the Chinese “educational aggression,” as it is the only economic and 
military force in South Asia that rivals China in any way. 
 China’s record shows that she is aggressive on almost every border that she 
has, including in the ocean. China has more contiguous countries than any other in the 
world. Laos has the only land border with China that has never been disputed.117 One 
can assume that the only reason for a country not to have a disputed border with 
China is acceptance of subjugation under Chinese hegemony. The one exception to 
this rule may be Russia, as the Sino-Russo border was delimited around the time that 
the U.S.S.R. was a world power second to none. 
 It is capricious of the Chinese to assert that there is no historical delimitation 
of the border between Tibet and India, then to try to bring historical evidence to the 
table. China suggested that they owned the areas of dispute because they had 
collected taxes in these areas, suppressed revolts, and defended the frontier 
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militarily.118 In this, they mean that Lhasa had collected taxes, suppressed revolts, and 
that it was the Tibetan Army that had responded to frontier questions. The McMahon 
Line was accepted by Tibetans while they were autonomous and able to enter into 
treaties. And, at the time of the Simla Convention, it was not the McMahon Line that 
China objected to, only the definition of Tibet as autonomous under suzerainty. 
 Maxwell goes on to say that China was prepared to live with the McMahon 
line, but that Indian over-reaching in other sectors caused them not to have an 
accord.119 Yet, if China was prepared to accept the McMahon line and a fair boundary 
in other areas, then Beijing should have consented to the terms of the Colombo 
proposals. It was not because of an unfair Indian claim that a deal has not been struck 
between India and China. It is because China is posturing in a way that allows them 
to protest that they are not aggressing, while India stares down the barrel of her gun. 
China purposefully avoids reconciliation to keep the boundary question open. In this, 
China is able to slowly gain more territory; she backs down her only legitimate 
hegemonic challenge, and is gaining a foothold in the Himalayas, ensuring military 
dominance in South Asia. 
 China’s relationship with Pakistan exists only to divide Indian attention and 
aggravate India militarily. The Sino-Pakistani relationship has existed since the 
1960s. Robinson speculates that is a mutually-beneficial relationship which China 
uses to counter India and which Pakistan uses to ensure protection.120  
 Now, India is caught between two pincers, Pakistan on one side and Chinese 
Tibet on the other. Lhasang Tsering said on the two borders: “India has more at stake                                                         
118 Stahnke, 113. 
119 Maxwell, 1981. 1547. 
120 Robinson, 386. 
  41 
in Tibet’s future than Tibetans.121”He calls the border a “cancerous wound” that is 
bleeding India’s economy. One third of the Indian defense budget is spent on Tibet. 
Another third goes to the border with Pakistan. Were the border tensions to take a 
course for war, India would simply be out-gunned and over-exhausted by the two 
fronts.  
 Maxwell tells that it was Indian propaganda that made it out to be Chinese 
aggression that started the 1962 war.122 This is unfounded. India had no desire to 
come into any conflict with China whatsoever; her military as poorly equipped as it 
was and untrained to fight in high altitudes. Though Indian generals may have 
thought that they could meet Chinese aggression, as an aggressor they knew they had 
no chance. Maxwell’s accusation is also inconsistent with accounts of Nehru both 
personally and as a politician, and diverges from the facts about the 1962 war and the 
events preceding it. 
 Still, with all the antagonism between India and China, and despite the failure 
of a policy of appeasement in the past, India treads carefully when it comes to China. 
When China reacted to the Dalai Lama’s visit in Tawang, a senior official in India 
said, “Keeping the sensitivity of the area, we’ve advised His Holiness to amend his 
programme.123” India asked that he change his public address scheduled for 
November 12th to a religious discourse, and restricted press permits to the area. India 
has proven that it is still wary of Chinese disapproval of the Dalai Lama.  
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 There seems to be no key to a peaceful agreement on the border issue. “There 
is no question of ‘if,’” Lhasang Tsering said, passion flowing from him as he talked 
about the nation that occupied Tibet and took his homeland from him, China, “will 
not [come to a resolution on the border], because it’s not in China’s interest to do 
so.124” He felt Chinese aggression in Tibet; he knew firsthand what China’s ambitions 
meant for countries that were in its way. And it seems that that this land that China 
has occupied and is in the process of systematically destroying, the revival of this 
nation could be the only way to create harmony in south Asia. In the words of 
Lhasang Tsering, “The issue of Tibet is not just about Tibetans. It is about the roof of 
the world. It’s about peace between India and China.125” 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Ladakh-Tibet Peace Treaty of 1684∗ 
 
 The Drukpa (red sect) Omniscient Lama, named Mcephanwagpo, who in his 
former incarnations had always been the patron Lama of the kings of Ladakh, from 
generation to generation, was sent from Lhasa to Tashis-gang, to arrange the 
conditions or a treaty of peace—for the Ladakh king could never refuse to abide by 
the decision of the Omniscient One. 
 
 It was agreed as follows: 
(1) The boundaries fixed, in the beginning, when king Skyid-Ida ngeerma gave a 
kingdom to each of his three sons, shall be maintained. 
(2) Only Ladakhis shall be permitted to enter into the Ngarees-khor-sum wool 
trade. 
(3) No person from Ladakh, except the royal trader, the Ladakh Court, shall be 
permitted to enter Rudock. 
(4) A royal trader shall be sent by the Deywa Zhung (i.e., the Grand Lama of 
Lhasa), from Lhasa to Ladakh, once a year, with 200     horse-loads of tea. 
(5) A “Lo-chak” shall be sent every third year from Leh to Lhasa with presents. 
As regards the quality and value of presents brought for all ordinary Lamas, 
the matter is of no consequence, but the Labrang Chhakdzot shall be given the 
following articles, viz: 
(a) Gold dust—the weight of 1 zho 10 times. 
(b) Saffron—the weight of 1 srang (or thoor srang) 
(c) Yarkhand cotton cloths—6 pieces 
(d) Thin cotton cloth—1 piece. 
 
 The members of the Lapchak Mission shall be provided with provisions, free 
of cost, during their stay at Lhasa, and for the journey they shall be similarly provided 
with 200 baggage animals, 25 riding ponies, and 10 servants. 
 
                                                        
∗ This treaty was signed after a war between Ladakh and Tibet. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Peace Treaty Between the Ruler of Jammu, the Emperor of China and the lama 
Guru of Lhasa (1842) 
 
As on this auspicious day, the 2nd of Assuj, Sambat 1899 (16th or 17th  
September 1842 A.D.) we, the officers of the Lhasa (Government), Kalon of Sokan 
and Bakshi Shajpuh, Commander of the Forces and two officers on behalf of the most 
resplendent Sri Khalsaji Sahib, the asylum of the world, King Sher Singhji and Sri 
Mharaj Sahib Raja-i-Rajagan Raja Sahib Bahadur Raja Gulab Singhji i.e., the 
Muktar-ud-Daula Diwan, Hari Chand and the asylum of vizirs, Vizir Ratnun, in a 
meeting called together for the promotion of peace and unity, and by professions and 
vows of friendship, unity and sincerity of heart and by taking oaths like those of 
Kunjak Sahib, have arranged and agreed that relations of peace, friendship, and unity 
between Sri Khalsaji and Sri Maharaj Sahib Bahdur Raja Gulab Singhji, and the 
Emperor of China and the Lama Guru of Lhasa will hence forward remain firmly 
established for ever; and we declare in the presence of the Kunjak Sahib that on no 
account whatsoever will there be any deviation, difference or departure from this 
agreement. We shall neither at present nor in future have anything to do or interfere at 
all with the boundaries of Ladakh and its surroundings as fixed from ancient times 
and will allow the annual export of wool, shawls, and tea by way of Ladakh 
according to the old established custom.  
 
Should any of the opponents of Sri Sarkar Khalsaj and Sri Raja Sahib Bahadur at any 
time enter our territories, we shall not pay any heed to his words or allow him to 
remain in our country. 
 
We shall offer no hindrance to traders of Ladakh who visit our territories. We shall 
not even to the extent of a hair’s breadth act incontravention of the terms that we have 
agreed to above regarding firm friendship, unity, the fixed boundaries of Ladakh and 
the keeping open of the route for wool, shawls, and tea. We call Kunjak Sahib, Kairi, 
Lassi, Zhoh Mahan, and Khushal Choh as witnesses to this treaty. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Convention between Great Britain, China and Tibet – 1914 
 
 His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and 
of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Excellency the 
President of the Republic of China, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, being 
sincerely desirous to settle by mutual agreement various questions concerning the 
interest of their several States on the Continent of Asia, and further to regulate the 
relations of their several Governments, have resolved to conclude a Convention on 
this subject and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, 
that is to say: 
 His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and 
of the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India, Sir Arthur Henry 
McMahon, Knight of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Companion of 
the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Secretary to the Government of India, 
Foreign and Political Department; 
His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Monsieur Ivan Chen, Officer 
of the Order of China HO; 
 His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Paljor Dorje; 
who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them 
to be in good and due form have agreed upon and concluded the following 
Convention in eleven Articles: -  
 
Article 1 
 The Conventions specified in the Schedule to the present Convention shall, 
except in so far as they may have been modified by, or may be inconsistent with or 
repugnant to, any of the provisions of the present Convention, continue to be binding 
upon the High Contracting Parties. 
 
Article 2 
 The Governments of Great Britain and China recognising that Tibet is under 
the suzerainty of China, and recognising also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to 
respect the territorial integrity of the country and to abstain from interference in the 
administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai 
Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa. 
 The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese 
province. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion 
of it. 
 
Article 3 
Recognising the special interest of Great Britain, in virtue of the geographical 
position of Tibet, in the existence of an effective Tibetan Government, and in the 
maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and 
adjoining States, the Government of China engages, except as provided in Article 4 of 
this Convention, not to send troops into Outer Tibet, nor to station civil or military 
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officers, not to establish Chinese colonies in the country. Should any such troops or 
officials remain in Outer Tibet at the date of the signature of this Convention, they 
shall be withdrawn within a period not exceeding three months. The Government of 
Great Britain engages not to station military or civil officers in Tibet (except as 
provided in the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet) 
nor troops (except the Agent’s escorts), nor to establish colonies in that country. 
 
Article 4 
 The foregoing Article shall not be held to preclude the continuance of the 
arrangement by which, in the past, a Chinese high official with suitable escort has 
been maintained at Lhasa, but it is hereby provided that the said escort shall in no 
circumstances exceed 300 men. 
  
Article 5 
The Governments of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any 
negotiations or agreements regarding Tibet with one another, or with any other 
Power, excepting such negotiations and agreements between Great Britain and Tibet 
as are provided for by the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain 
and Tibet and the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China.  
 
Article 6 
 Article II of the Convention of April 27, 1906 between Great Britain and 
China is hereby cancelled, and it is understood that in Article IX (d) of the 
Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet the term “Foreign 
Power” does not include China. 
 Not less favourable treatment shall be accorded to British commerce than to 
the commerce of China or the most favoured nation. 
 
Article 7 
 (a) The Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 are hereby cancelled. 
(b) The Tibetan Government engages to negotiate with the British 
Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles II, IV 
and V of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet 
without delay; provided always that such Regulations shall in no way modify the 
present Convention except with the consent of the Chinese Government. 
 
Article 8 
 The British Agent who resides at Gyantse may visit Lhasa with his escort 
whenever it is necessary to consult with the Tibetan Government regarding matters 
arising out of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, 
which it has been found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or 
otherwise. 
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Article 9 
 For the purpose of the present Convention the borders of Tibet, and the 
boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, shall be as shown in red and blue 
respectively on the map attached hereto. 
 Nothing in the present Convention shall be held to prejudice the existing 
rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet, which include the power to select 
and appoint the high priests of monasteries and to retain full control in all matters 
affecting religious institutions. 
 
Article 10 
 The English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of the present Convention have been 
carefully examined and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any 
difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative. 
 
Article 11 
The present Convention will take effect from the date of signature. 
In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this 
Convention, three copies in English, three in Chinese and three in Tibetan. 
Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D. one thousand nine hundred and 
fourteen, corresponding with the Chinese date, the third day of the seventh month of 
the third year of the Republic, and the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of 
the Wood-Tiger year. 
 
Addendum No. 1 
 At the page 38 of the memorandum of the Dalai Lama’s Government on the 
International position of Tibet it has been contended that Article 1 of the Convention 
of 1914, which recognised Chinese suzerainty, did not come into operation and was 
devoid of any legal effect. This is fully substantiated by the Treaty of Ratification 
concluded between Great Britain and Tibet which brought into force the Convention 
of 1914. A copy of the English translation of the Tibetan version of the Treaty is 
enclosed herewith. 
 
Treaty of Ratification between Great Britain and Tibet 
(English Translation) 
 The plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Tibet accept the following treaty. 
 The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Tibet will recognise 
and abide by the Convention already concluded. 
 The powers granted to China under the Convention shall not be recognised by 
Great Britain and Tibet until and unless the Government of China ratify the 
Convention. 
 This treaty in two copies each of English and Tibetan versions respectively 
have been sealed and signed on the 3rd of July, 1914 corresponding to the tenth day of 
the fifth month of the Wood Tiger Year. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet 
(17-point Agreement of May 23, 1951) 
 
 The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within 
the boundaries of China and, like many other nationalities, it has done its glorious 
duty in the course of the creation and development of the great Motherland. But, over 
the last 100 years or more, imperialist forces penetrated into China and in 
consequence also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all kinds of 
deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary Governments, the 
Kuomintang reactionary Government continued to carry out a policy of oppression 
and sowing dissension among the nationalities, causing division and disunity among 
the Tibetan people. The local government of Tibet did not oppose the imperialist 
deception and provocation and adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards the great 
Motherland. Under such conditions the Tibetan nationality and people were lunged 
into the depths of enslavement and sufferings. In 1949 basic victory was achieved on 
a nationwide scale in the Chinese people’s war of liberation; the common domestic 
enemy of all nationalities – the Kuomintang reactionary Government – was 
overthrown and the common foreign enemy of all nationalities – the aggressive 
imperialist forces – was driven out. On this basis the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China (CPR) and of the CPG was announced. 
 In accordance with the Common Programme passed by the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the CPG declared that all nationalities 
within the boundaries of the CPR are equal and that they shall establish unity and 
mutual aid and oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the CPR 
will become a big family of fraternity and co-operation, composed of all its 
nationalities. Within the big family of all nationalities of the CPR, national regional 
autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated and 
all national minorities shall have freedom to develop their spoken and written 
language and to preserve or reform their customs, habits and religious beliefs, and the 
CPG shall assist all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural, 
and educational construction work. Since then, all nationalities within the country – 
with the exception of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan – have gained liberation. 
Under the unified leadership of the CPG and the direct leadership of higher levels of 
people’s governments, all national minorities have fully enjoyed the right of national 
equality and have exercised, or are exercising, national regional autonomy. 
 In order that the influences of aggressive, imperialist forces in Tibet might be 
successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the CPR 
accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality 
and people might be freed and return to the big family of the CPR to enjoy the same 
rights of national equality as all other nationalities in the country and develop their 
political, economic, cultural and educational work, the CPG when is ordered the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to march into Tibet, notified the local government 
of Tibet to send delegates to the central authorities to conduct talks for the conclusion 
of an agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. At the latter part of 
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April, 1951 the delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet arrived in 
Peking. The CPG appointed representatives with full powers to conduct talks on a 
friendly basis with the delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet. 
As a result of the talks both parties agreed to establish this agreement and ensure that 
it be carried into effect. 
(1) The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces 
from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the 
Motherland – the People’s Republic of China. 
(2) The local government of Tibet shall actively assist the PLA to enter Tibet 
and consolidate the national defences. 
(3) In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the 
Common Programme of the CPPCC, the Tibetan people have the right of 
exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the 
CPG 
(4) The central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. 
The central authorities also will not alter the established status, functions 
and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office 
as usual. 
(5) The established status, functions and powers of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni 
(Lama) shall be maintained. 
(6) By the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of 
the Panchen Ngoerhtehni are meant the status, functions and powers of the 
thirteenth Dalai Lama and of the ninth Panchen Ngorhtehni when they 
were in friendly and amicable relations with one another. 
(7) The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common 
Programme of the CPPCC shall be carried out. The religious beliefs, 
customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected and lama 
monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will not effect a 
change in the income of the monasteries. 
(8) The Tibetan troops shall be reorganized step by step into the PLR and 
become a part of the national defence forces of the CPR. 
(9) The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan 
nationality shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual 
condition in Tibet. 
(10) Tibetan agriculture, livestock-raising, industry and commerce shall be 
developed step by step and the people’s livelihood shall be improved step 
by step in accordance with the actual condition in Tibet. 
(11) In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no 
compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The local government of 
Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and, when the people 
raise demands for reform, they shall be settled by means of consultation 
with the leading personnel of Tibet. 
(12) In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomintang officials 
resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the Kuomintang and do not 
engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office 
irrespective of their past. 
  50 
(13) The PLA entering Tibet shall abide by all the above-mentioned 
policies and shall also be fair in all buying and selling and shall not 
arbitrarily take a needle or thread from the people. 
(14) The CPC shall have centralised handling of all external affairs of the 
area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with the 
neighbouring countries and establishment and development of fair 
commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality. 
(15) In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the CPG shall 
set up a Military and Administrative Committee and a Military Area HQ 
in Tibet and apart from the personnel set there by the CPG shall absorb as 
many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local 
Tibetan personnel taking part in the Military and Administrative 
Committee may include patriotic elements from the local government of 
Tibet, various districts and various principal monasteries; the name-list 
shall be set forth after consultation between the representatives designated 
by the CPG and various quarters concerned ad shall be submitted to the 
CPG for appointment. 
(16) Funds needed by the Military and Administrative Committee, the 
Military Area HQ and the PLA entering Tibet shall be provided by the 
CPG. The local government of Tibet should assist the PLA in the purchase 
and transport of food, fodder and other daily necessities. 
(17) This agreement shall come into force immediately after signatures and 
seals are affixed to it. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
The Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet, Signed 29 April 1954 
 
Agreement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on 
Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India. 
 
 The Government of the Republic of India and the Central People’s 
Government of the People’s Republic of China, being desirous of promoting trade 
and cultural intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India and of 
facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India, have resolved to 
enter into the present Agreement based on the following principles: 
(1) Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; 
(2) Mutual non-aggression; 
(3) Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 
(4) Equality and mutual benefit; and 
(5) Peaceful co-existence. 
And for this purpose have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries: 
The Government of the Republic of India, His Excellency Nedyam Raghavan, 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India accredited to the People’s 
Republic of China, the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republich of 
China, His Excellency Chang Han-fu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central 
People’s Government, who, having examined each other’s credentials and finding 
them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following: 
 
Article 1 
 The high contracting parties mutually agree to establish trade agencies: 
1. The Government of India agree that the Government of China may 
establish trade agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong. 
2. The Government of China agree that the Government of India may 
establish trade agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok. 
The trade agencies of both parties shall be accorded the same status and same 
treatment. The trade agents of both parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while 
exercising their functions and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives and 
children who are dependent on them for livelihood, freed from search. 
 The trade agencies of both parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities 
for couriers, mail bags and communications in code. 
 
Article 2 
 The high contracting parties agree that traders of both countries known to be 
customarily and specifically engaged in trade between the Tibet Region of China and 
India may trade at the following places: 
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APPENDIX F 
 
The Proposals of the Conference of Six Non-Aligned Nations Held at Colombo∗ 
(December 10 to 12, 1962) 
 
1. The conference considers that the existing de facto ceasefire period is a 
good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese conflict. 
 2. (a) With regard to the Western Sector, the Conference would like to make 
an appeal to the Chinese Government to carry out their 20 kilometres withdrawal of 
their military posts as has been proposed in the letter to Prime Minister Chou En-lai 
to Prime Minister Nehru of November 21 and November 28, 1962. 
 (b) The Conference would make an appeal to the Indian Government to keep 
their existing military position. 
 (c) Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the 
Chinese military withdrawals will be a demilitarized zone to be administered by 
civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon, without prejudice to the rights of the 
previous presence of both India and China in that area. 
 3. With regard to the Eastern Sector, the Conference considers that the line of 
actual control in the areas recognised by both the Governments could serve as a 
ceasefire line to their respective positions. Remaining areas in this sector can be 
settled in their future discussions. 
 4. With regard to the problems of the middle Sector, the Conference suggests 
that they will be solved by peaceful means, without resorting to force. 
 5. The Conference believes that these proposals, which could help in 
consolidating the ceasefire, once implemented, should pave the way for discussions 
between representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entailed 
in the ceasefire position. 
 6. The Conference would like to make it clear that a positive response for the 
proposed appeal will not prejudice the position of either of the two Governments as 
regards its conception of the final alignment of the boundaries. 
 
                                                        
∗ When presented to Peking, this document was accompanied by a document entitled “The Principle 
Underlying the Proposals of the Six,” which exhaustively details the reasoning behind each of the 
Colombo Proposals. 
 
  53 
MAP 1 
 
Map Produced in the Simla Conference of 1914, Initialled by British, Chinese, and 
Tibetan plenipotentiaries. 
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MAP 2 
 
The Eastern Sector 
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MAP 3 
 
The Western Sector 
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MAP 4 
 
The Northern Frontier of India 
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Methodology and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
 I spent my time in Dharamsala looking at rare books in the Library, reading, 
and finding articles. I also conducted four separate interviews, during which each 
person I interviewed provided a different view on the issue. I kept myself aware of 
anything that could pertain to the subject of border dispute as I travelled around, and 
skimmed local bookshops for relevant material. 
 I would suggest that further research be conducted in the field, particularly by 
visiting a disputed area. There, one can get a true idea of the local opinion of the two 
governments. I would especially suggest, and highly consider studying in Tawang, as 
it is one of the most hotly contested areas, and is also rich in culture and history. 
 
 
 
A picture of myself, reading and taking notes. 
 
